Introduction
A ubiquitous feature of the U.S. retail industry is the growth and dominance of large national chains in the retail industry. The best known is Wal-Mart but large, national chains in many different retail sectors have become paramount. Jarmin et al. (2005) document the increasing preeminence of national chains and their impact on the size distribution and firm turnover rates in retail trade. Foster et al. (2006) show that virtually all of the productivity growth in the U.S. retail trade market over the 1990s is due to more productive entering establishments affiliated with national chains displacing much less productive exiting establishments that are "mom and pop" single-unit establishment firms. An open question is the factors that prompted these dynamics and in turn the factors that led some national chains like Wal-Mart, Starbucks and Olive Garden to succeed dramatically over the last few decades.
Some existing studies have started to investigate these patterns. For example, Holmes (2006) explores some of the tradeoffs affecting Wal-Mart as it opens new establishments in the U.S. and how these factors influenced the overall location pattern followed by the firm.
We build on this literature by following the growth paths of retail firms from 1977 to 2002 using establishment and firm-level data from the Census of Retail Trade and the Longitudinal Business Database. We begin by exploring the paths followed by firms of different chain types -comparing for example the dynamics of single-unit establishment firms to those we designate as Mega firms (firms that operate in at least 15 states). Consistent with the recent literature, we find that Mega firms increasingly dominate the retail trade sector and exhibit different patterns of volatility as measured by job creation and destruction as well as entry and exit. Given their increasingly dominant role, we then focus our attention on the Mega firms to understand the patterns of expansion for such firms. In particular, we look for patterns in the geographic expansion, size, transition from privately-held to publicly-owned, and propensity to expand via establishment entry vs. acquisitions for the firms that came to dominate the retail trade industry over this twenty-five year period. The approach in this analysis is descriptive as it is our objective to provide a set of basic facts that underlie this fundamental change in the structure of retail trade that can be used to develop and test hypotheses for the factors underlying this change.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review to help put the questions and approach of the paper into context. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 4 presents an overview of the patterns of structural change in the retail trade sector. This section very much builds on the recent literature and it is clear from this section as well as the recent literature that large, national chain retail firms increasingly dominate the retail trade sector. Section 5 provides an analysis of the patterns of job creation and destruction and entry and exit at both the establishment and firm level across chain types. Section 6 begins the exploration of the evolution of the large, national firms that became paramount in the retail trade sector by 2002. Concluding remarks are given in section 7.
Literature Review
As noted in the introduction, the dramatic changes in the retail trade sector have yielded a burgeoning literature documenting and exploring the factors underlying the transformation. Jarmin et al. (2004 and 2005) take advantage of the newly developed Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) to document and analyze the patterns of growth and change in the retail trade sector. They find an increasingly dominant role of large, national chains in retail trade activity as measured by payroll and employment. Moreover, they quantify the extent and patterns of firm and establishment entry and exit in the retail trade sector. Not surprisingly, entry and exit rates are relatively high in retail trade (e.g., compared to manufacturing) but they also find that entering establishments are much larger in terms of relative size to incumbents as compared to their manufacturing counterparts. They also show that the patterns of activity and change vary across market size and type. Rural areas are still served by a relatively large number of singleunit establishment firms but in rural areas such firms are experiencing net losses. In larger markets, there is higher firm turnover. They also find that single-unit firms and large, national chains are more likely to coexist in some industries (such as Eating and Drinking) and less likely in others (like General Merchandise stores).
One outstanding example of the dramatic changes among retail trade firms is Wal-Mart.
Not surprisingly, some of the literature documenting and studying the evolving structure of the sector focuses on Wal-Mart. Basker (2005) studies the labor market effects of Wal-Mart entry into a local market. She finds that although there is an initial increase in employment in the local area, over the subsequent five years a Wal-Mart entry yields exits and contractions by competitors. She also finds evidence for upstream effects via a decline in wholesalers' employment. Holmes (2006) also explores Wal-Mart entry dynamics but with a different perspective. Holmes documents the geographic pattern of expansion of Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart started in Bentonville, Arkansas and its expansion path shows that it first expanded into local, then regional and then finally national markets. Holmes models the firms expansion decision as a tradeoff between taking advantage of the economies of density (favors operations in close proximity) versus locating in the market with the highest quality (unlikely to favor operations in close proximity).
These dramatic changes in the structure of the retail trade sector have been associated with the productivity growth in the retail trade sector over this period of time. Foster et al. (2006) show that virtually all of the labor productivity growth in the U.S. retail trade sector over the 1990s is accounted for by more productive entering establishments displacing much less productive exiting establishments. Interestingly, the large productivity gap between low productivity exiting single-unit establishments and entering high productivity establishments from large, national chains plays a disproportionate role in these dynamics.
While much has been learned from this burgeoning literature, our understanding of the structural changes in the retail trade sector is still limited. The recent development of the LBD (see Jarmin and Miranda, 2002) has provided a rich new resource in its own right for the study of these issues (as is evident in Jarmin et al. (2004 Jarmin et al. ( , 2005 
Data and Measurement Issues
The empirical analysis in this paper uses data from the Census of Retail Trade (CRT).
The Census Bureau conducts a survey of retail trade establishments every five years (those years ending in '2' and '7'). The survey questionnaire is mailed out to all large and medium-sized firms and generally all firms that operate multiple establishments; most very small firms are excused from answering the questionnaire. The data for these very small firms come from two sources: either a Census sample of these very small firms or administrative records from other federal agencies. We use both reported data and administrative data in our empirical exercises because there is no reason to suppose that the administrative records data are inferior to the reported data for the variables being used in this study.
The CRT contains data on establishments concerning the kind of business, physical location, sales in dollars, annual and first quarter payroll, and employment for the pay period SIC consistent basis.
The retail trade sector grows significantly during our sample period, but roughly speaking, there are about 1.5 million establishments with 20 million paid employees generating $2.5 trillion in real sales in retail trade in a given year. The CRT also collects information on firm ownership of establishments. There are approximately 1 million firms in retail trade in each year in our sample. It is apparent from the relative magnitudes of the number of firms and establishments that most firms in retail trade are single-unit establishments.
We restrict our sample to establishments that can be matched to the LBD because we will use LBD data in part of our analysis. We further restrict our analysis to establishments that have positive employment (and sales and payroll). This restriction on positive employment helps us to increase the quality of our data in early Census years. Our sample exhibits quantitatively similar time series patterns as the published data of the full universe of the retail trade sector.
We define chains in terms of the number of states in which a firm has establishments operating (or the number of establishments in operation for single-state firms The cutoffs of these different types of chains in terms of number of states are arbitrary, but as will become clear, are quite instructive for characterizing the changing structure of the U.S.
retail trade industry.
In some of our analysis, we consider whether the firm is publicly traded. Our data on whether the firm is publicly traded are derived from merging the LBD with COMPUSTAT (unfortunately, we do not yet have this data for 2002). (from 50% to 38%) and a concomitant increase for Mega firms (from 22% to 35%).
Trends in Chain Types
In interpreting these shares, it is important to emphasize that the decline in the Single firms share is not due to a falling number of firms or to falling employment (indeed employment for Single firms has been rising) but rather the dramatic growth of Mega firms. It is also worth noting that there is some evidence of acceleration in the growth, particularly for real sales, among the Mega firms during the second half of the period. According to Figure Further information about the size distribution of employment across chain types is presented in Table 2 . The top panel shows average employment size of the different types of firms. In Table 2 we see stark differences between the average size of Single firms and Mega firms. However, even these stark average size differences do not fully capture the drastic differences in the size distribution. The lower panel of Table 2 shows the average size of firms weighted by employment. This statistic provides a summary measure of the coworker mean which is the size of the average firm for the average worker (see Davis et al. (1996) The difference between the coworker mean and the simple mean provides information about the skewness of the size distribution. An interesting feature of Table 2 is that the distribution of Mega firm sizes is very skewed in its own right. Put differently, while Mega firms are large on average, their size distribution is very skewed so that the average worker at a Mega firm works for a very large firm.
The main point of this introductory analysis is the increasingly dominant role of Mega firms in retail trade. In our subsequent analysis, we seek to explore the nature of the dramatic increase in the role of Mega firms. Before turning to that analysis, we examine the patterns of job creation and destruction and entry and exit across chain types. This analysis provides a richer picture of the restructuring in the retail trade sector over the last couple of decades.
Reallocation Between and Within Chain Types
The analysis in the prior section provides evidence of the restructuring between chain types over the last few decades in the retail trade sector. To look deeper into this restructuring, we calculated job creation and destruction as well as entry and exit rates so that we could examine the pace and nature of the restructuring within chain types. In terms of methodology, we follow the methods developed and described in Davis et al. (1996) and that we used for the retail trade analysis in Foster et al. (2006) . In calculating and constructing these measures, we use both the establishment and the firm as the units of observation. For job creation by establishments, we measure the employment gains by all expanding and entering establishments from one period to the next. Entry reflects the true births of establishments in the sense that there is a new establishment at a physical location in the year in question. For job destruction, we measure the employment losses by contracting and exiting establishments. Exit reflects the true death of establishments in the sense that the establishment at a given physical location ceases operations at that location. We follow Davis et al. (1996) and convert the flows to rates by dividing the flows by the average of employment in the current and prior period. In considering the patterns reported in this section, by construction all job flow measures are employment-weighted growth rates and we report the entry and exit rates on an employmentweighted basis as well. All of the job flow and entry and exit rates reported in this section are over a five-year horizon. As in the prior section, we assign establishments to chain types based upon the characteristics of the parent firm. At the firm level, job creation and destruction numbers reflect analogous concepts but firm entry and exit now reflect the entry of a new firm (which may be from an ownership change) or the exit of a firm (again which may be from an ownership change). In subsequent sections, we take advantage of information about acquisitions and divestitures to explore such changes more fully but for now it is important to recognize the concept of firm entry and exit used in this subsection. percent below the job creation by establishments for Mega firms and job destruction for Mega firms is about 15 percent below the job destruction by establishments for Mega firms. These differences imply that Mega firms exhibit considerable within firm reallocation. That is, they are shrinking some establishments while expanding others within the Mega firms. to contract but if they do contract they often do so via exit. Thus, in terms of net entry rates of establishments we observe that the much higher net entry rate of establishments for Mega firms is due to much lower exit rates. Now turning to the share of job creation and destruction by entering and exiting firms, the pattern for Single firms is about the same as at the establishment level and is high around 80 percent. In contrast, for Mega firms only a very small share of the job creation at the firm level is due to firm entry. The low share for Mega firms combined with the lower firm level creation rate in Figure 5 implies a low entry rate for Mega firms, it varies between 4 and 8 percent over the sample over a five-year horizon. This pattern is not surprising since even over a five-year horizon few firms are born as Mega firms. Those that are born as Mega firms are in part new firms created from mergers and acquisitions (something we look at in the next section). Still,
we can see that with the low entry rate at the firm level that this is not the typical path for becoming a Mega firm.
In terms of job destruction we see very different patterns across chain types as well.
Mega firms have a much lower share of job destruction from firm exit than Single firms. In addition, as we saw in Figure 5 the job destruction rate for Mega firms is low. The five-year exit rate at the firm level is around 7 or 8 percent of employment.
In considering these patterns of job creation and destruction as well as entry and exit, it is useful to note that the average size of establishments varies across chain types including the size of the typical entrant across chain types. For example, in 2002 the average single unit incumbent establishment had 11 employees, the average single unit entrant had 9 employees, the average incumbent establishment belonging to a Mega firm had 35 employees and the average entering establishment belonging to a Mega firm had 27 employees. Thus, part of the story of the relatively high share of job creation from entrants for Mega firms is the size of the typical entrant. Still, the entry rates for Mega firms are relatively high as well.
Putting the pieces together, we find that Mega firms are much more stable than their
Single firm counterparts in terms of firm and establishment level job destruction. Once created, an establishment from a Mega firm as well as the overall Mega firm is much less likely to contract and exit than a Single firm. Thus, in an accounting sense, the rise of the Mega firms is not because of the lack of job creation and entry by Single firms (this has remained consistently high) but rather the almost as high job creation and establishment entry for Mega firms and the very low job destruction and establishment and firm level exit of Mega firms.
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In terms of overall establishment and firm volatility, the increasing role of Mega firms is clearly a factor contributing to the decline in firm and establishment volatility documented by 5 Or the flip side is how is it that large Mega firms have such high rates of job creation from establishment level entry. A common finding on job flows is that small establishments and firms have high job creation and destruction rates. This pattern holds in retail trade for Single-units. However, for Megas they have a high rate of establishment entry and very low rate of establishment exit.
Mega Firms
The previous section has illuminated the increasing dominance of Mega firms in retail trade, we now turn to examining the path and the factors that led to this phenomenon. We explore the dynamics of Mega firms by focusing on the Mega firms in 2002 and examining how they evolved over the 25 years of our sample. To begin this analysis, we examine the dynamics of these firms by the year of entry of the firm. Since a firm is a legal entity that owns physical establishments, it is possible to define the first year of the firm using either the first appearance of the legal entity or of the oldest physical establishment that the firm owns. We examine this distinction in the Data Appendix and find that the same basic patterns reported in Table 4 hold when we define age of the firm using the age of the oldest establishment. In what follows, we restrict our analysis to using the firm age defined by the age of the legal entity. We believe for current purposes this definition of firm age is of interest since understanding the evolution to Mega status may be connected to merger and acquisition activity. Indeed, in the analysis below we look at the role of acquisitions for the expansion patterns of Mega firms. However, the analysis in the Data Appendix suggests this is not a major factor in the results.
Cohort Analysis of 2002 Mega Firms
Given that the 2002 Mega firms represent a rich blend of older and newer firms, we explore a cohort analysis of the 2002 Mega firms. For this analysis, we focus on the cohort analysis by birth year of the firm and restrict our analysis to the 2002 Mega firms. By doing this we intentionally introduce sample selection since we want to illuminate the evolution of the 2002 firms (i.e., how we got here). In conducting this analysis, we are not identifying when the Mega 2002 firm became a Mega but rather when it first started operation as any type of firm.
As should already be clear from by a new firm identifier, this "firm birth" may in fact reflect change in ownership structure (for example through merger and acquisition activity) as well as de novo firms. The analysis in the prior section shows that the firm entry rate for Mega firms is very low so this does not appear to be a major factor. Still, it is of interest to explore the difference between firm and establishment age in this context, which is something we plan to explore further in future drafts. All of the cohort plots (e.g., Figure 6 -10) are based on a simple regression specifications interacting year effects with birth cohorts. As such, the regressions recover the means of the variable of interest for each birth cohort by year. The estimated effects are precisely estimated given the sample size -for example in Figure 6 all of the standard errors are 0.2 or below. In future drafts, we will find a parsimonious way of reporting the standard errors associated with these estimates of means by group. 7 It is tempting to make inferences about labor productivity from comparing Figures 6 and 7. The caution in making such inference is that sales per worker differ substantially across industries and the analysis thus far does not hold industry composition fixed. Thus, spurious movements in sales per worker can occur in the aggregate as the industry composition changes. In future drafts of the paper, we will explore the role of labor productivity which will require a careful tracking of establishment and firm level industry which is a bit of a challenge over this sample given the switch from SIC to NAICS in 1997 and 2002.
The cohort analysis helps provide an interpretation of the prior finding (in Table 1 ) that showed an overall relatively modest change in average log employment and average log real sales for Mega firms. Figures 6 and 7 show that within a surviving cohort of Mega firms, there is substantial growth especially taking into account the pre-history of firms that ultimately become Mega firms (that is, following firms from birth not from the time they achieved the Mega classification). However, each new cohort comes in smaller than the incumbents and this suggests that a composition effect is important to understanding the overall changes in average size for all firms from one year to the next. That is, while there may be growth within birth cohorts, the entry of a new cohort with smaller average size at entry will tend to reduce the average size of all Mega firms in any given year. 8 A related point is that the growth of the Mega firms while Mega firms neglects the pre-history growth as firms transit to becoming Mega firms. While these patterns hold for all of the cohorts, the 1982 cohort appears to have followed a slightly different path. The patterns in Figure 9 shed light on whether the growth patterns within cohorts in Mega firms are, not surprisingly, much more likely to be publicly traded than the typical firm.
Still, it is interesting that there is such a close correspondence in the growth patterns exhibited in
Figures 6-9 and the share of publicly traded firms by birth cohort. While causality cannot be inferred it is clear that getting funding from going public is often part of the process of being and becoming one of the dominant Mega retail trade firms in the U.S. economy.
The Role of Acquisitions
Our cohort analysis has shown that each cohort of Mega firms has grown rapidly over the last several decades, we now explore the role of acquisitions of existing establishments versus entry of new establishments in this growth. To gain some perspective on the relevance of acquisitions for Mega firms, Table 5 percent had only one. Given these patterns of acquisition, we now turn to the growth patterns of these two different groups.
Here we repeat the cohort analysis but break a given cohort into two groups: those firms that added at least one establishment via an acquisition over the 25 year horizon and those that did not. Figures 11, 12 and 13 show key patterns for the cohorts classified in this manner. The top panel of Figure 11 shows the log number of establishments per firm by cohort of the 2002
Mega firms for firms that did not acquire an existing establishment while the lower panel shows the equivalent pattern for those firms with acquisitions. While both groups show rapid growth, 9 A simple regression analysis at the firm level could shed more direct light on this question and we plan this in future drafts.
there are distinct differences in the patterns. Consider the 1977 cohort, for example. The 2002
Mega firms from the 1977 cohort that only increased the number of establishments via entry of establishments (true births) started with a substantially smaller number of establishments (around 7 in 1977) but exhibited phenomenal growth of almost 300 log points. For the same cohort that had at least one acquisition they started substantially larger (about 50 establishments) but also exhibited rapid growth of around 200 log points. This same qualitative pattern is repeated for other cohorts. Thus, the group that used only establishment entry grew faster than the group that used acquisitions, although the latter group is clearly larger especially for the oldest cohort. We should note in interpreting this pattern that even the group that had acquisitions likely grew largely via establishment entry. Recall that Table 3 shows that almost 80 percent of job creation at the establishment level for Mega firms is via establishment entry. Taken together, Table 5 and Figures 11-13 show an important role for firms with acquisitions. 11 About 72 percent of 2002 Mega firms had at least one acquisition over the time period so they are the dominant group. Moreover, Figures 11-13 show they are also larger than 10 In future drafts, we will explore empirical decompositions of the growth patterns of the different cohorts identifying the contribution of acquisitions, establishment entry and the like. 11 We have also explored the patterns for real sales per firm by cohort and obtain results similar to those reported in Figure 11 .
the group without acquisitions. However, the group that expanded only via establishment entry grew very rapidly over the last 25 years, while they constitute only 28 percent of Mega firms by 2002 they are about as large on many dimensions as the counterparts with acquisitions.
Conclusions and Future Research
The growth of chain firms in the U.S. retail trade sector that has been documented in the than the establishments of Mega firms. However, the job destruction and exit rate of Single firms is much higher than for Mega firms and enough so that net aggregate growth rate of Mega firms far exceeds that for Single firms. Thus, one question we should be asking is what are the factors that yield much higher exit rates for Single firms. In considering this question, it is worth noting that we do not observe any discernable trend in job destruction and exit rates for Moreover, in the spirit of Holmes (2006) , there must be economic factors that help account for the different patterns observed across birth cohorts, industries and firm types.
Holmes suggests, for example, that there are potential tradeoffs between economies of density and expanding to the highest quality retail sites. Another factor that may be playing a role is the IT revolution which, arguably, has helped Mega firms like Wal-Mart develop sophisticated inventory management and distribution networks that are critical for being able to take advantage of the economies of scale of Mega firms. We certainly do not address this latter question in any direct way but our evidence should be helpful in evaluating such questions. For example, Jarmin et al. (2004 Jarmin et al. ( , 2005 note that the rising share of large, national firms predates the IT revolution. However, our evidence suggests that there has been an acceleration in the growth of Mega firms since the mid 1980s. On the other hand, our evidence is that Single firms have been consistently entering at a high rate over this entire period but their exit rate has remained high as well. Any IT based explanation would need to take into account the job destruction and exit patterns we have detected. In short, the current analysis is a long way off from providing enough guidance to identify the economic factors that have led to the dominant role of Mega firms, but it is our hope that this type of detailed description of the evolution of retail firms can aid in such identification.
12 The industry level analysis will permit us to explore productivity dynamics in this context. Foster et al. (2006) have already explored productivity dynamics across chain types but their analysis ended with the 1997 CRT and also did not explore all of the different dimensions of Mega firm dynamics. 
Data Appendix Summary Statistics for the Retail Trade Sector

Industry Coding Issues
The 1977 and 1982 CRT have some establishments with industry codes that fall outside of retail trade. When an industry code falls outside of retail trade in our sample, we look first in the LBD for the same year and then in the next CRT. These matches greatly improve the industry codes for 1977 and 1982. Nevertheless, there are still about 200,000 in employees in 1977 and 100,000 in 1982 that are coded outside of retail trade.
There are special issues concerning a SIC-based version of retail trade in 2002. The SIC definition of retail trade is more broad than the NAICS definition of retail trade (notably it includes Eating and Drinking Places). However, part of the NAICS version of retail trade is also not under the SIC definition. These NAICS-only industries are ones that had been wholesalers selling as retailers and repair shops. Ideally we would like to remove these establishments from our sample but this is not possible. While we can identify all continuers from 1997 that should be part of SIC-based CRT this only covers continuers. We still have extra establishments in our version of the 2002 SIC-based CRT due to unclassifiable births.
Comparing Establishment and Firm Age
Since a firm is a legal entity that owns physical establishments, it is possible to define the first year of the firm using either the first appearance of the legal entity or of the oldest physical establishment that the firm owns. We examine this distinction in the cross tabulation shown in Table A2 . Table A2 shows firm first years for the 2002 Mega firms defined by the year the firm identifier first appears in the LBD (rows) and by the year the oldest establishment that the firm owns first appears (columns). We find that many Mega firms own establishments older than the firm itself. For example, 37 of the Mega firms whose firm identifier first appeared in 1982 (second row) had oldest establishments that first appeared in 1977 (first column). Given the size and geographic scope of these firms, perhaps this is not too surprising. What is a bit more surprising is that some of first years dated by the "oldest" establishments are younger than the parent firm. For example, ten of the Mega firms whose firm identifier first appeared in 1977 (first row) had oldest establishments that first appeared in 1982 (second column). To understand how this can happen, recall that all of the Defining firm first year by the age of the oldest establishment shifts the firm age distribution of the 2002 Mega firms to the right. That is, the 2002 Mega firms have higher average ages when one defines age through oldest establishments rather than the firm identifier. To see how this may impact some of our earlier results, we turn to Table A3 which reproduces  Table 4 using the oldest establishment as the identifier of firm births. It is still the case that most of the activity in 2002 of the Mega firms is from firms that existed in 1977 but few of them were Mega firms in 1977. Thus, in a broad sense our earlier findings are confirmed. (1977-82 and 1982-87 averaged) and end (1992-97 and 1997-2002 averaged) of the sample period. Note: Cells that cannot be disclosed are denoted by "D." 
